룰렛 게임 사이트한국언론룰렛 게임 사이트

1.회원 여러분의 건승을 기원합니다.

2.서울대학교 룰렛 게임 사이트BK21 FOUR "자유롭고 책임있는 AI 미디어" 교육연구단과 언론정보연구소에서 <Emerging Scholars Series를 진행합니다.이에 다음과 같이 안내해 드리니,관심 있는 회원님들의 많은 참여 바랍니다.

-다 음-

서울대학교 룰렛 게임 사이트 BK21 FOUR "자유롭고책임있는AI미디어"교육연구단과언론정보연구소에서<Emerging Scholars Series를진행합니다. 2월8일에는Nanyang Technological University의Poong Oh교수님강연이예정되어있습니다.

이강연은온라인(ZOOM)으로만진행됩니다.특강참여시화면은켜주시기바랍니다.

일시: 2월8일(수) 10:30–12:00

참여링크: https://snu-ac-kr.zoom.us/j/96387182332

발표자: Poong Oh (Nanyang Technological University)

Poong Oh is an Assistant Professor at the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University. He earned his PhD degree from University of Southern California and worked as a postdoctoral research fellow at University of Pennsylvania prior to joining NTU. His research focuses on the collective behavior of networked populations, including coordination problems, conflict resolution, and collective information processing and decision making, and more importantly, the role communication plays in them. He is also interested in diverse data-analytic methods and their applications for research, including network analysis, agent-based modelling, Bayesian nonparametric, and data mining among others. His work has been published inNature: Scientific Reports,Communication Theory,Social Networks,Journal of Physics: Complexity, etc. He always welcomes any kinds of intellectual discussion about any topics.

제목:How to Lie If You Must: The Evolutionary Dynamics of Trust and Deception

초록:

In this talk, the speaker will introduce a part of his working project,the Preemptive Defensive Mechanisms against the Strategic Use of False Information(funded by the Ministry of Education of Singapore), focusing on theoretical problems with deception and trust. The talk will begin with a brief overview of the evolutionary models of communication and key findings in previous literature, followed by developing the current model of deception and trust.

In previous literature, the elementary form of languages is defined as a collection of signal-meaning associations, and communication is formulated as a special kind of coordination problems (Lewis, 1969; Skyrms, 2010; Oh & Kim, 2021). The current model, however, introduces a liar who is paid off by misleading and thereby causing harms to others and formulates the inter-population relation between liars and naïve receivers into the predator-prey dynamics demonstrated by Lotka-Volterra equations.

The results from a series of numerical experiments will be presented to account for the decline of trust in a population due to the invasion of liars, as illustrated in theBoy Who Cried Wolf, a fable of Aesop. Also, the results show the presence of a stable attractor rather than Nash equilibria, suggesting the possibility of the restoration of trust without centralized authorities, which allows an alternative interpretation of Kant's normative proposition about the impossibility of universal deception stated inthe Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals(1785). Finally, both theoretical and empirical implications of the current study will be discussed.